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Policy Options Dwindle as Economic Fears Grow
WASHINGTON
(By
Peter S.
Goodman,
NYT) August
29, 2010
—
The American economy is once
again
tilting
toward
danger.
Despite an
aggressive
regimen of
treatments
from the
conventional
to the
exotic —
more than
$800 billion
in federal
spending,
and
trillions of
dollars
worth of
credit from
the Federal
Reserve —
fears of a
second
recession
are growing,
along with
worries that
the country
may face
several more
years of
lean
prospects.
On Friday,
Ben
Bernanke,
chairman of
the Fed,
speaking in
the measured
tones of a
man whose
word choices
can cause
billions of
dollars to
move,
acknowledged
that the
economy was
weaker than
hoped, while
promising to
consider new
policies to
invigorate
it, should
conditions
worsen.
Yet even as
vital signs
weaken —
plunging
home sales,
a bleak job
market and,
on Friday,
confirmation
that the
quarterly
rate of
economic
growth had
slowed, to
1.6 percent
— a sense
has taken
hold that
government
policy
makers
cannot
deliver
meaningful
intervention.
That is
because
nearly any
proposed
curative
could risk
adding to
the national
debt — a
political
nonstarter.
The
situation
has left
American
fortunes
pinned to an
uncertain
remedy:
hoping that
things
somehow get
better.
It
increasingly
seems as if
the policy
makers
attending
like
physicians
to the
American
economy are
peering into
their
medical kits
and coming
up empty,
their
arsenal of
pharmaceuticals
largely
exhausted
and the few
that remain
deemed too
experimental
or laden
with risky
side
effects. The
patient —
who started
in critical
care — was
showing
signs of
improvement
in the
convalescent
ward earlier
this year,
but has
since
deteriorated.
The doctors
cannot agree
on a
diagnosis,
let alone
administer
an antidote
with
confidence.
This is
where the
Great
Recession
has taken
the world’s
largest
economy, to
a Great
Ambiguity
over what
lies ahead,
and what can
be done now.
Economists
debate the
benefits of
previous
policy
prescriptions,
but in the
political
realm a rare
consensus
has emerged:
The future
is now so
colored in
red ink that
running up
the debt
seems
politically
risky in the
months
before the
Congressional
elections,
even in the
name of
creating
jobs and
generating
economic
growth. The
result is
that
Democrats
and
Republicans
have
foresworn
virtually
any course
that
involves
spending
serious
money.
The growing
impression
of a
weakening
economy
combined
with a
dearth of
policy
options has
reinvigorated
concerns
that the
United
States risks
sinking into
the sort of
economic
stagnation
that
captured
Japan during
its
so-called
Lost Decade
in the
1990s. Then,
as now,
trouble
began when a
speculative
real estate
frenzy
ended,
leaving
banks awash
in debts
they
preferred
not to
recognize
and hoping
that bad
loans would
turn good
(or at least
be
forgotten).
The crisis
was deepened
by
indecisive
policy, as
the ruling
party
fruitlessly
explored
ways around
a painful
reckoning —
boosting
exports,
tinkering
with
accounting
standards.
“There are
many ways in
which you
can see us
almost
surely being
in a
Japan-style
malaise,”
said the
Nobel-laureate
economist
Joseph
Stiglitz,
who has
accused the
Obama
administration
of
underestimating
the dangers
weighing on
the economy.
“It’s just
really hard
to see what
will bring
us out.”
Japan’s
years of
pain were
made worse
by deflation
— falling
prices — an
affliction
that
assailed the
United
States
during the
Great
Depression
and may be
gathering
force again.
While
falling
prices can
be good news
for people
in need of
cars,
housing and
other wares,
a sustained,
broad drop
discourages
businesses
from
investing
and hiring.
Less work
and lower
wages
translates
into less
spending
power, which
reinforces a
predilection
against
hiring and
investing —
a downward
spiral.
Deflation is
both symptom
and cause of
an economy
whose basic
functioning
has stalled.
It reflects
too many
goods and
services in
the
marketplace
with not
enough
people able
to buy them.
For more
than a
decade, the
global
economy was
fueled by
monumental
spending
power
underwritten
by a pair of
investment
booms in
America —
the Internet
explosion in
the 1990s,
then the
exuberance
over real
estate. As
housing
prices
soared,
homeowners
borrowed
against
rising
values,
distributing
their
dollars to
furniture
dealers in
suburban
malls, and
furniture
factories in
coastal
China.
But the
collapse of
American
housing
prices
severed that
artery of
finance.
Homeowners
could not
borrow, and
they cut
spending,
shrinking
sales for
businesses
and
prompting
layoffs.
Early this
year, some
economists
declared
that the
cycle was
finally
righting
itself.
Businesses
were
restocking
inventories,
yielding
modest job
growth in
factories.
Hopes
flowered
that these
new wages
would be
spent in
ways that
led to the
hiring of
more workers
— a virtuous
cycle.
But the
hopes failed
to account
for how
extensively
spending
power had
dropped in
the American
economy, and
how uneasy
people were
made by
every
snippet of
data showing
that houses
were not
selling,
employers
were not
hiring, and
stock prices
were
foundering.
Now, a new
cause for
concern is
growing: the
flat
trajectory
of prices,
which might
metastasize
into a
full-blown
case of
deflation.
The primary
way to
attack
deflation is
to inject
credit into
the economy,
giving
reluctant
consumers
the
wherewithal
to spend.
The chief
deflation
fighter is
the Federal
Reserve,
which
traditionally
adjusts a
benchmark
overnight
rate for
banks that
influences
rates on car
loans,
mortgages
and other
forms of
credit. The
Fed pulled
this lever
long ago,
and has kept
its target
rate near
zero since
late 2008.
The Fed has
also been
more
creative.
During the
worst of the
financial
crisis, the
Fed relieved
American
banks of
troubled
investments,
many linked
to
mortgages,
to give the
banks room
to make new
loans.
This
engendered
the sort of
debate
likely to
fill
doctoral
dissertations
for
generations.
Most
economists
praise the
Fed for
confronting
the
possibility
of another
depression.
But the Fed
added to the
nation’s
debts,
provoking
talk that it
was testing
global faith
in the
dollar.
The dramatic
expansion of
the national
debt — which
began in the
Bush
administration,
via hefty
tax cuts and
two wars —
has
ratcheted up
fears that,
one day,
creditors
like China
and Japan
might demand
sharply
higher
interest
rates to
finance
American
spending.
Those rates
would spread
through the
economy and
inflict the
reverse of
deflation:
inflation,
or rising
prices, as
merchants
lose faith
in the
sanctity of
the dollar
and demand
more dollars
in exchange
for oil,
electronics
and other
items.
So far, the
reverse has
happened. As
investors
lose faith
in real
estate and
stocks, they
are flooding
into
government
savings
bonds,
keeping
interest
rates
exceedingly
low. Still,
inflation
worries
occupy the
people who
control
money, not
least the
governors of
the Fed. The
Fed has been
seeking a
graceful
exit from
its
interventions,
aiming to
unload its
cache of
mortgage-linked
investments
and — likely
in the far
future —
lift
interest
rates.
But the
recent
disturbing
economic
news has
delayed
those plans.
This month,
the Fed said
it would
take the
proceeds
from its
mortgage-linked
investments
and buy
Treasury
bills to
keep
longer-term
interest
rates down.
The Wall
Street
Journal
reported
that this
decision
came amid
substantial
disagreement
among the
Fed’s
governors,
suggesting
that future
action will
be
constrained
by fears of
inflation.
Republicans
in Congress
have
embraced
further tax
cuts and
less
spending as
the answer
to the weak
economy,
while
accusing the
administration
of
squandering
stimulus
spending on
efforts that
brought
little gain.
Some
conservative
analysts
liken the
government’s
reliance on
spending and
credit to
imbibing
another
cocktail to
take the
edge off a
hangover. In
this view,
the weak
economy
should be
welcomed for
the
discipline
it imposes,
forcing a
paring back
of
unsustainable
spending,
while
building up
savings that
can finance
investment
and later
feed healthy
economic
growth.
“The
recession is
the cure for
the disease
that affects
the economy,
but the
politicians
don’t have
the stomach
for it,”
says Peter
Schiff,
president of
Euro Pacific
Capital, a
Connecticut-based
brokerage
house.
“They’re
going to
keep
stimulating
the economy
until they
kill it with
an overdose.
The
hyper-inflation
that results
is going to
be far worse
than the
cure.”
Germany,
which has
long
harbored
particularly
powerful
fears of
inflation,
has done
relatively
well in the
current
downturn
without
large
stimulus
spending,
and that
experience
is now cited
by adherents
of
austerity.
But it can
be argued
that the
Germans had
two
advantages
over
Americans: A
more
extensive
social
safety net
to give
consumers
more money
and the
confidence
to spend it,
and a
vibrant
manufacturing
base to
churn out
more goods
for export.
Most
economists
who are
close to the
policy
making arena
for both
parties take
the position
that
austerity is
the wrong
medicine for
what ails
the American
economy, and
they dismiss
warnings
about
inflation as
akin to
focusing on
the side
effects of
chemotherapy
in the face
of cancer.
First, they
argue, take
the medicine
and stave
off the
lethal
threat; then
deal with
the
collateral
problems.
Regardless,
inflation
fears
persist,
constraining
what limited
prescriptions
might
otherwise be
thrown at a
weakening
economy.
The
impending
elections in
November —
with control
of Congress
hanging in
the balance
— has
further
narrowed the
contours of
political
possibility
Six months
ago, Alan
Blinder, a
former vice
chairman of
the Federal
Reserve, and
now an
economist at
Princeton,
dismissed
the idea
that
America’s
political
system would
ever allow
the country
to sink into
a
Japan-style
quagmire.
“Now I’m
looking at
the
political
system
turning
itself into
a paralyzed
beast,” he
says, adding
that a lost
decade now
looms as “a
much bigger
risk.”
Congress and
the Obama
administration
have ruled
out further
stimulus
spending.
The Fed
appears to
be running
out of
powder. “Its
really
powerful
ammunition
has been
expended,”
Mr. Blinder
says.
Even after
the November
election,
few expect a
different
dynamic.
“We’re
already in a
gridlock
situation,
and nothing
substantive
is going to
change,”
says Bruce
Bartlett,
who was a
Treasury
economist in
the first
Bush
administration.
“Clearly, a
weak economy
in 2012 will
be very good
for whoever
the
Republican
presidential
candidate
is. It’s
hard to see
how the
Republicans
lose by
blocking
stimulus.”
On the other
hand, if
deflation
emerges as a
verifiable
menace, many
economists
expect Mr.
Bernanke —
an expert on
the Great
Depression —
to again
champion
aggressive
measures,
perhaps
expanding
the Fed’s
balance
sheet to buy
pools of
auto loans
or credit
card debt.
“It’s very
likely the
Fed will
bend in that
direction if
the economy
stays soft,
especially
if they are
starting to
see
deflation,”
says Kenneth
S. Rogoff, a
former chief
economist at
the
International
Monetary
Fund, and
now a
professor at
Harvard.
“That’s
really
starting to
loom.”
On Friday,
Mr.
Bernanke,
whose board
can operate
independent
of politics
and the
government,
offered
assurance
that he
still had
powerful
therapies to
use should
conditions
worsen. Yet
he also
expressed
concern
about the
potential
side
effects,
underscoring
a reluctance
for more
action.
“The issue
at this
stage is not
whether we
have the
tools to
help support
economic
activity and
guard
against
disinflation,”
he said. “We
do.” Then he
added: “The
issue is
instead
whether, at
any given
juncture,
the benefits
of each
tool, in
terms of
additional
stimulus,
outweigh the
associated
costs or
risks of
using the
tool.”
Right now,
many
homeowners
owe the bank
more than
their homes
are worth,
prompting
some to
abandon
properties,
adding
inventory to
a market
choked with
vacant
addresses.
An Obama
administration
program
aimed at
slowing
foreclosures
has
prolonged
trouble, say
some
economists,
by failing
to relieve
borrowers of
unsustainable
debt burdens
or making
transparent
the extent
of losses
yet to be
confronted
by the
financial
system.
“The big
question is,
who’s going
to swallow
the losses,”
says Mr.
Stiglitz.
“It should
be the
banks, but
they don’t
want to.
We’re likely
to be in
paralysis
for years if
they
prevail.”
The Treasury
sits in the
middle,
concerned by
the
continued
weakness of
housing, yet
unwilling to
pressure
banks to
write down
mortgage
balances.
Like their
Japanese
counterparts
a decade
ago,
Treasury
officials
worry that
forcing the
banks to
take losses
could weaken
them and
risk another
crisis.
By default,
muddling
through has
emerged as
the
prescription
of the
moment.
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